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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

W. C. LAMOREAUX,
Plain.tiff-Awellant,

-vs.-

No.12791

GRAND COUNTY, et al.,
·
Defendant-Rest><J'tldent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court for
Grand County, Utah
Honorable Calvin Gould, mstrict J'fliJJge.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. C. LAMOREAUX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 12791

-vs.GRAND COUNTY, et al.,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a summary judgment denying counsel a fee under state law for work done by appointed counsel in a habeas corpus review in the Federal
Court involving impecunious prisoners.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the motion for Summar:· '
Judgment, depriving appointed counsel of a fee on the
theory that the Utah Statute does not reach work donr in
the Federal Courts in defense of impecunious criminals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal so that the county shall pay
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l'i·(•s for a

in the

successful reversal under habeas corpus attack
Courts.

STATEMENrr OF THE FACTS
On Jnne 30, 19G9, Liberatore and Jackson were

arrestt>d in Grand County, Utah, on charges of Grand
Larceny; and they being without funds, the City Judge
appointed Luke Pappas as counsel and bound them over
to the District Court for trial on said felony. (R 19) A
trial was had. without jury and the Court convicted them
on said felony; thereafter they were sentenced and transfrnrcl to the lTtah State Prison. They had no contact
1.rith thrir appointed attorney after the day of their
sentcncP. (R 12, 8) The prisoners pro se attempted to
activate their appointed attorney, Mr. Pappas, to "attack
the conviction" (R 39) but to no avail. (R 8) The prisoners, not hearing from their appointed counsel, (R 38)
asked the 'l'rial Court to appoint another attorney to
represent them in their post-conviction proceedings, but
.Tndge Nhea refused, and the Court released Pappas from
dnties. (R 33, 34, 52)

In this period the Supreme Court of Utah twice re.ic'ded the vro se att0mpts of the prisoners to achieve
review. (R 30, 51)
All attempts by the prisoners to get counsel and
rl'view failed. 'l'lwy filed their petition for habeas corpus
with the United States Court on an impecunious affidavit. (R 14, 26-57) Thereafter, Judge Ritter ordered
Appellant to go to the prison, investigate the matter, and
-3-

report to him within one week. ( R 17) This appointed
attorney did as requested, reporting to the Court that
the prisoners had probable cause.
A hearing was had before said Federal Court which
resulted in a denial of the Writ, whereupon appointed
counsel perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals. 'l1his
appeal resulted in a remand "to determine if petitioner,
were advised of their right to counsel on appeal and if
they waived that right." (R 9-16) At the subsequent
hearing, the Attorney General of Utah stipulated with
appointed counsel: "Pappas ... indicated that in com- ,
municating with the petitioners herein, he did not discuss with them their right to appeal." (R 8) Thereupon,
the Attorney General of Utah moved the, Court for its
order granting habeas corpus, releasing the prisoners.
(R 7)

Appellant petitioned respondents for a fee under
Utah's statute providing minimum standards for impecunious criminals. ( 77-64-1) Said petition was rejected. (R 1, 2) On suit being filed, respondents admitted
111 hours work at $20 per hour was reasonable compensation but argued on motions for summary judgment the
statute did not apply to work done in the federal courts.
(R 23, 25, 61, 65, 77) The state court granted respond- '
ents' motion to dismiss, hence this appeal. (91-93)
I

THE LOWER COURT ER.RED
IN REFUSING TO COMPENSATE APPOINTED
COUNSEL
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II istorically, the Utah Lawyer could not be paid
for defen<ling impecunious criminals, this because Utah
l1ad no statute on the subject.
RUCKENBROD v MULLINS, 133 P2d 325; 144
ALR 839
Tlw Indiana court was one of the leaders in the states
to reqm re payment of lawyers defending impecunious
crirninab.

t,ANE "BHff\VN, 372 US 487, 1963
'rlH' Utah Constitution guarantees the accused "the

right to a ]l )'(,ar and def end in person and by counsel."
Art. T. Sec. 12. It also states "All courts shall be open,
and
pc•rson, for an injury done to him ... shall have
n•rne(l\'
(ll'P conrse of law ... and no person shall be
lmnecl from prosecuting or def ending before any tribunal
in thi:' state ... " Art. I, Sec. 11.
1'11e UHiteJ States Constitution, by the Sixth Amendment, gnarantees the accused the "assistance of counsel
for his def<·nse''; and in 1963 bv GIDEON v WAINIYRICHl'l', i3"/'.2 US 335; 9 L Ed 2d 799, the U.S. Supreme
Comt held it obligatory on the states by the 14th AmendlllPnt, to se<' tlwt tl1(-' accnsed Pnjoys counsel at all stages
nf a criminal proe<•eding. Many states now passed laws to
pay ro1msel in snch cases. At the oral argument, counfor DPfendants stated that all but three states have ennett•d statutt>s paying counsel.

'rhe 19G5 Utah Legislature enacted 77-64-1 which
fnr the first time set np minimum standards to be pro-5-

vid(·<l h>- the several connti<·s of
for irnpt>cuniou,,
persons involved in crime who face '"tlw
of 1Jw
deprivation of hi::; lihert:' or other serious criminal san(·tion." rl1 lrns the vacunm created for the nonpayment of
counsel in Ruckenbrod v Mullins above was once and for
all remedied by a strong, integrated statute that
few limitations on payment of counsel. Said staute
enacted following an important clllster of U.S. Supreme
Court cases, including the following:
GRIFFIN v ILLINOIS, 351 US 12; 55 ALR2u
1055
DOUGLAS v CALIFORNIA, 372 rs 35;); 9 L Ed
2d 811
ESKRIDGE v \VASHINGTON, 357 US 21-1-,
SMITH v BENNETT, 365 US 708, 1971
JOHNSON,. ZERBST, 304 US 458
ANDERS v CALIFORNIA, 38G US 738; 18 L Ed
493
In the decision by the District Court, (R 90) rPference is made that the "jndicial power of the state shall ,
be vested in a Supreme Court, in District Conrts," rtr.
Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Let this Court square snch a concPpt
with Art. I, Sec. 3:
"The state of Utah is an inseparable part of th1·
Federal Union and the Constitution of the Uniterl
States is the sHpreme law of the lafl1d."
The Utah Statute setting up snch minimum standards as aforesaid, has been construed by the Utah Supreme Court, including:
WASHINGTON COFNTY v DAY, 22 Utah 2d 6:
447 P2d 189
-6-

v DIXON, 448 P2d 716; 22 Utah 2d 58

v DAVIS COUNTY, 1971, No. 12311

'J'hese Utah cases hold that appointed counsel shall
be paid by the county.
ln \V ashington County v Day, the Utah court said:
" ... it must not be misunderstood that lawyers
alone among all the professions can be compelled
by the legislative authority to undertake free
services for impecunious people ... vVe think a
legislature intended to and did remove the
burden of affording counsel for impecunious
in criminal cases from the tired
shouldns of the legal profession and placed it
npon society, where it has always rightfully belonged. . . It seems clear to us that the County
i:-; hy Section 1, obligated to furnish the minimum
·'''mnclards.... \Ve hold that where a county makes
no arrangements for representation of indigent
U('f Pndants in criminal cases, the court is authoriZ('(l to appoint connse 1 for the defendant."
In Ntate v Dixon, the r:tah Court reiterated the above
Day ;'pir:t, and lwld:

'"Phe rontention of Weber County in the Dixon
cas(' tlia t it should not be responsible for the fees
on arnic·al lwcanse appointment was made by this
Co1irt is withod merit.i'

Tn Bennett v Diwis County, the Utah High Court
of this ne-Y\' legislation:
"1'1w objective of this corrective legislation was
to ameliorate the prior condition, wherein an offi('Pr of tlw Conrt was compelled to contribute his
time and efforts gratuitously."

-7-

The question to be decided in this proceeding stPlllB
from appointed counsel's vindication in the FPderal
Courts of Sixth Amendment rights deprived to the
accused in a state proceeding. The defendants in the
criminal case involved in this proceeding did not have
the advise of counsel in their post-conviction attem 11t0
to get appeal and other incidental rights. (R 8) The 10th
Circuit remanded in JACKSON & LIBERATORE v
TURNER, 442 F 2d 1303, 1971. By reason of said decision and the constitutional questions raised, the Attorney General of Utah stipulated the prisoners had not been
afforded minimum constitutional rights to counsel, and
the Court freed them. Thus, this is not the case of prisoners attempting to trump np baseless claims! Will this
Court assume the Court of Appeals and the Attorney
General of Utah failed to compass the appeal of the
prisoners in terms of the "fundamental principles, essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity
of free governmentr (Art. I, Sec. 27, Utah Constitution)
This Court, in BEAL v TURNER, 22 U2d 418, 454
P2d 624, closed its opinion with words that will ring
toward a reversal of the trial judge herein, completely
closing the question of exclusions from compensation
under the Utah statute:
"We hold that the intention of the legislature in
passing this statute was to limit the right of
counsel in matters subsequent to conviction and
sentence to appeals, applications for writs of
habeas corpus, and for writs of corum nobis,
matters affecting guilt or innocence and the
-8-

fairnr;ss of the trials by which those ends are
accomplished. It does not refer to revocation of
paro l es. "
The Utah Supreme Court twice closed its door to the
pro se prisoners, acting without cotmsPl because the trial
court would not give them post-conviction attention. (R
:ii, :m, 14) The appeal to the 10th Circuit resulted in
such a penetrating exposure of lack of procedural fairness that the Utah Attorney General chose to move that
the writ of habeas corpus issue. (R 11, 7, 8)

Appointed counsel had no further access to the Utah
Suprenw Court. 'J1he time to appeal had run during a
period when tlw vrisoners were ·without counsel. Will
this Court rule that appointed counsel would have been
paid had he vursnPd further remedies before this Court 1
Let us not lw coy. \Vhile then' are jurists who do not like
the past twent)· year's decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, that Comt is the supreme arbiter of ultimate
constitutional rights. The Utah kgislature bowed to that
Comt in rnacting the current statute to be construed.
This Court gave good attPntion to basic principles
hem invoked in BEAL v TURNER, 22 U2d 418, '-154 P2d
GU, in its rationalization of the Mempa case. This Court
recognized there the right of counsel in the post-conviction 1wriod; and ddermined that where counsel had not
lwen present aftrr "the critical stages of the proceedings
are ovrr,'' no constitutional error had been committed in
denying counsel in a parole violation. In the case at bar,
lhe critical stages involving appeal, collateral attack, had
not passed, and the prisoners were denied counsel!
-9-

lt was not the F<::'dt>rnl trial jndge \Vho fonnd in favor
of the prisoners. 'That Conrt has been
hy thit
Conrt for letting too mm1y pl'isoners fr<'e on habeas ]lroceedings. It Y1'as the Circuit Court on review that gavr·
the fundamental error its focus, remanding for fnrther
review. It was the Attorney General of Utah who confessed the wrong, without further evidence. (R 8)
'rl1is Court cannot say that counsel in the case at
bar was as •·useless" as the attorney was said to he in
BEAL in a parole violation!
This Court recognized appeal rights during the
·'contenhous'' period of his case in BEAL above. Let this
Conrt not slide over a basic constiutional issue. If the ,
imprisoned are to have counsel during the "contentions,"
''critical" periods, why say that counsel will he paid onl.1
for work done in the state courts? If the U.R. 8nprerne
Court determines the "supreme law of the land'' and thP
Utah legislature howed to its mandate for counsel at
''every stage of the procedeing" including review, appeal. '
habeas corpns, with encouragement to counsel to prosecute "other remedies" and gives him hope he may om
day be paid, why derogate from a highly remedial
ute? \Vas it not enacted for the benefit of connsel, as w1·U
as the
Because Congress has since enacted protection for 6th Amendment lawyers, no expensive precrdent \vill be set for vindicating the work donr in the case at
bar. (See point II)
The Utah Statute puts the burden on the county to '
see that the accused ·were "folly advised" at a sufficient]Y
-10-

(arlr :-dag<'. "Fnll ad\·icP" and "a complete
i rwlndP knowledge of and access to constitutional
,rwnnnt<'PS availahlP in th(• Federal Conrt if the state
'"
eoiirt;; do not honor basic rights and principles. Any
<·onstrndion will rob tlw Utah statute of its necesand olJYiou;-; force. Aiipoin tecl counsel must bring
10 l1rar "thr taking of appeals and tltP prosecntion of
othir remcdi1·s before and after a conviction . . . " The
1wc11sed nnd incarcerated must have "experienced, competent and z<·alons" counsel ''at every stage of the proccl'din.r;s." This dof'S not sonnd in cutting off any or all
f'1'clPral p;imrnntr·es or procedures! Appointed counsel
shall ·'Pros<'c1lt<' any appeals or other rcnicdies before or
u/11·r c1nn·iction that he considers to be in the interest
of ju,fice. The imrpose of this section is to give counsel
hroacl riowns to n·present the indigent defendant . . .
in uu1; ('rimind or quasicriminal proceeding ... including
i111l'11i!1· co11rts as ·w<>ll as the other coitrfs of this state
which
presentl.v created or which may be created in
tl1e fntmP ... halwas corpus, cornm nobis proceedings
and otlirr like proceedings that are not civil in nature."

77-G4-1 (1) UCA sets the scor)e in mandating that
the conrt shall rirovide counsel "for every indigent person ... who faees the possibilit)r of the deprivation of his
liherty or other serions criminal sanction." The only
rh•rogation of power is in 77-64-2 which requires a penalty
of six months confinement. Connsel will argue that the
11 '(' of the word "·of'' in 77-64-1 re·stricts application of
th(" statute to proceedings only "of the state of Utah."
'l'he comt can adopt this view; but in terms of the broad
-
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mandate of the statute, we submit such interpret.atiun
is sniveling. HovY will the TTtah courts otherwise deal
with ( 4:) "Come into orwration at a sufficiently early
stage ... as to fully advise and protect the def endanP"
In BEDFORD v SALT LAKE COUNTY, 22 U2d
12, 447 P2d 193, this conrt well stated: "The assignment
has been assumed by the lavvyer out of respect for thP
court in which he serves and ont of a sense of responsibility which lawyers feel towards lrnma.nity in general."
The court had cited Pardee v Salt Lake Count.\',
P
122, to show why the county should not at that date be
required to pay appointed counsel, but it said'' ... tl1at
in the absence of an express statute to the contrary an
attorney ... was not entitled to payment from the county." Is not the current statute sufficiently "express" to
give meaning to the court's talk of "the tired shoulders''
of appointed counsel?

1

In STATE v GRIFFIN, 135 N.W.2, 77 thP Iowa
court held:
"In cases such as this where court appointed
counsel handling the appeal is other than court
appointed trial counsel, the trial conrt on proper
showing being made, is directed to allow cou.nsel
fees for all of the appellate services as proY1ded
in Section 775.5, Code of Iowa, 1962, I.C.A. Such
fees are payable in the same manner as fees for
court appointed trial counsel."
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in BURNS v OHIO
360 US 252 at 257, that
" .. once the state chooses to establish appellate
-
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1

review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigrnts frmn access to any phase of tha t procednrc because of their poverty."
1

'L'he Utah statute gives full appellate rights in any
forum . .Jnst because the rights were vindicated in the
Federal formn is no reason to deprive connsel of his hire.
Section 12 of Article I of the Utah Constitution affords the right of ap11e al to all criminals "in all cases.1'
Does tliis mean appeal only to the Utah established court1
1

lf this conrt takes the position respondents' argued

for on pagP 73 to the effect that compensation covers
only repr<'sPntaiion of prisoners in courts "of the state
of Utah" no violence is done to the statute when the
further langnage therein is given a reasonable applicalion. Tinder the Utah statute the compass is as wide as
the wit of counsel to nse it.
The lawyer appointed to represent an impecunious

accused or prisoner is admonished under the Utah statute
to he "competent and zealous"; give' him a "complete
defense"; to "fully advise" and must contemplate "the
taking of appeals and the prosecuting of other remedies
he fore and after conviction considered by the defending
conusel to be in the interest of justice." (Why the legislature repeated this language in 77-64-3 is for the Court
to decide.) The statute insists that counsel employ
"broad powers to represent the indigent ... in juvenile
courts as well as the other courts of this state " and
habeas corpus is specifically listed as an avenue of 'travel.
Imagine the appointment of the defense attorney, ad-
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rnonishing him that he cannot employ the rights, guaran
tees of the Federal Constitution and Courts in implement. ,
ing the defense afte·r state remedies have been exhausted
and still be paid !
Even though members of this Court may not care for
the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Legislature of Utah spoke after these fundamental, mini.
mum rights were enunciated by that Court.
In sum, if this Court meant what it said in the concluding paragraph of Beal v Turner, supra, the only issue
of law concerns the fairness of the, Courts involved in
the post-conviction perid. Even this Court said to the
prisoners acting without counsel "File Closed." (R Gl)
Appellant did what the Court having jurisdiction told
him to do. He looked into the procedure employed and
attacked with the weapons of the law. He did not do
this just for a fee. That the legislature· had passed sneh
a far-reaching statute encouraged him to do his best and
to spare no time. It was not a question of the guilt or
innocence of the prisoners, but of constitutional righto,

1

1

and procedural "fairness." That it took resort to the
Federal Courts, including the Circuit, should not deprive
him of compensation mandated by the Utah statute. Like '
any other lawyer, appellant would do it again if requested
by and in any court !
II
A REVERSAL WILL NOT
SET A BAD OR EXPENSIVE PRECEDENT

-H-

l :rnkr tl1e terms of Title 18, 300GA, U.8.C.A., there
ran lw little question that Appellant could be compensated now by federal moneys for work herein:
".1£ach United States District Court, with the approval of the judicial counsel of the circuit shall
place in orwration ... a plan for furnishing represen ta tion for any person financially unable to
obtain adequate representation ... ( 4) for whom
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires
the appointment of counsel. ... "

rr1w di l'ficnlty is that this statute did not take effect
11ntil Fr•hruary 12, 1971. Reference to Pages 3 to 6
of the n·eord \\ill show that 90% of the work by Appellant was do1w prior to the effective date of said federal
t'llabling statute. Tlw former Act of 19G5, covering fees
for
representing impecunious persons accused
of crimr did not reach the Sixth Amendment cases, hence
tl1e anwndment abovP.
This casP involves only an "in-beihveen" situation.
Were Appellant to do today that ·which was recorded in
hrn timP n•rord (R 6) there is no doubt that the Federal
Act. and frdPral money would rornpPnsate him. He was
his dnt,\' at a time when Congress had not acted
on Gtlt .ArnPrnlrnent type rases, but a fair interpretation
of tl1P Utah stat11tP would say that Utah believes in compen-;ation of appoint<'d counsel in the use of all of the
tooh of tlw law, not just some of thPm.

\,r

BPspondPnt's belief, as Pxpressed at the bottom of
71 of the rerord, \\'ill ring a little hollow in terms
1
tl l' wi(l(' anus of the Utah statute. To accomplish real
-
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due process, and procedural fairness, no harm will be
done to the coun1ties of Utah by holding to the higher
standard permitted by the Utah Minimum Requirements
Act.

Because the Congress has now set up the statute to
pay Sixth Amendment counsel, the decision of this Court
to require Grand County to pay will not set an expensive
precedent. It will simply make a sensible interpretation
of the statute and give due process and equal protection
to a lawyer who did his duty.
This Court articulated basic principles of the taking
of the lawyer's property \vithout just compensation, due
process, and equal protection, in Bedford v Salt Lake
County, supra. This Court should vindicate the conscientious work of counsel and hold that the statute suf.
ficiently l'mbraces the work done. It is not the amount
of compensation here contended for; it is the principle.
Counsel will be fair; he will be glad to submit to a lower
figure if the conscience of the Court will weigh in favor
of "some" compensation.
CONCLUSION
No question has been raised as to reasonableness
of the time expended, the amount charged. It is solely
an interpretation of the Utah statute. No re-al mischief
will result from a holding in Appellant's favor. To decide
to the contrary will raise constitutional 14th Amend·
ment and equal protection arguments unworthy of the
bench and bar of Utah.
Respectfully submitted
W. C. LAMOREAUX
-16-

